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I. INTRODUCTION 
Described by leading scholars as intricate,1 “hopelessly convo-
luted,”2 “byzantine,”3 or even a “hideous creature,”4 immigration law is a 
conundrum of a sort—very difficult to teach to law students, let alone 
explain to the ordinary migrant new to the American legal system. A 
learned judge described the difficulty associated with immigration law, 
stating, “Whatever guidance the regulations furnish to those cognoscenti 
familiar with [immigration] procedures, this court, despite many years of 
legal experience, finds that they yield up meaning only grudgingly and 
that morsels of comprehension must be pried from mollusks of jargon.”5 
In his book, Everyday Law for Immigrants, Professor Victor Romero 
breaks this “hideous creature” down into its most basic cells with as-
tounding efficiency and care to provide the ordinary person with the es-
sentials of how immigration status is acquired, maintained, and lost. 
                                                 
† Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Richard Delgado for taking the time to comment on an early draft of this Review. 
 1. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY, at viii (6th ed. 2008). 
 2. Stephen H. Legomsky, reviewing VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS, 
at back cover (2009). 
 3. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY 1 (4th ed. 2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at viii (citing Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909, 919 
(5th Cir. 1981)). The law has become significantly more complicated in the decades following this 
statement. 
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The book is quite remarkable. It not only presents complex mate-
rials in plain and understandable language, but also employs a creative 
analogy between immigration law and contracts to help the reader gain a 
better understanding of immigration law. Throughout the book, Professor 
Romero masterfully demonstrates, for the benefit of those who make and 
interpret the law, the needlessness of immigration law’s complexity. As 
such, it is an extraordinary success in simplifying complex materials in 
the tradition of the Everyday Law Series—as attested to by the editors of 
the series, Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic6—and in guid-
ing the efforts of lawmakers and the judiciary to simplify the puzzle that 
is immigration law.7 This Review examines the fundamental assump-
tions, theories, approaches, and contents of each section of Professor 
Romero’s book to demonstrate how he effectively simplifies immigration 
law; a few humble critiques and suggestions are offered along the way. 
II. THE THEORETICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS 
OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROFESSOR ROMERO’S 
CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGM 
Professor Romero’s primary approach is the use of contract theory 
to explain the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of immigra-
tion law. He tells his readers that “[a]lthough it is tempting to think of 
immigration law as primarily involving human rights (especially when 
we consider the protections afforded refugees), it is perhaps more accu-
rate to view it as a form of contract law between the United States and 
the foreigner.”8 He explains that the “United States grants the noncitizen 
the privilege to enter the country for some specific purpose and amount 
of time, and, in exchange, the noncitizen promises to abide by the terms 
the country sets forth. Should the noncitizen breach his promise, he must 
leave the United States.”9 This is a remarkable way of simplifying the 
complex equation for the ordinary migrant. 
Professor Romero simplifies immigration law better than perhaps 
anyone who has attempted it before. When a party thinks about entering 
                                                 
 6. Author’s discussion with Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic. Other leading 
scholars further attest to this accomplishment. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 2; Ronald Schmidt, 
Sr., reviewing VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS, at back cover (2008). 
 7. This point is essential because immigration laws do not have to be as complicated as they 
are now and could be rewritten to avoid needless complexity. For example, Canada attempted to 
avoid unnecessary complexity by adopting a comprehensive and more coherent version of immigra-
tion law in 2001. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.), available at 
http://www.laws.justice.gc.ca/en//I-2.5/. It is sixty-seven pages long, easy to understand, and proba-
bly accomplishes the same objective as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), codified 
as amended under 8 U.S.C. (2006). 
 8. VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS 5 (2008). 
 9. Id. 
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a contract, the party first wonders what her side of the bargain will be. 
Professor Romero helps migrants understand and appreciate this aspect 
of the immigration “contract.” This approach is pragmatic and excee-
dingly helpful for the ordinary migrant. Perhaps the second topic a party 
to a contract will think about is the fairness of the contract terms. 
The question of fairness has a universal character, and as such, each 
migrant, regardless of cultural background, will be concerned with the 
fairness of the contract that he gets into. Although a substantial portion 
of Professor Romero’s body of academic writing, including his recent 
and excellent book Alienated,10 is devoted to the inquiry of fairness from 
different perspectives, in the interest of simplicity and brevity, he does 
not import those discussions to this book. For a person who is not famili-
ar with Professor Romero’s rich body of work,11 his equating immigra-
tion law with contract law might appear as if he is either ignoring the 
issue of contract fairness or subscribing to the assumption that contracts 
are intrinsically fair so long as they are freely entered into. The latter 
school of thought assumes that a contract simply consists of keeping 
one’s promises regardless of their nature.12 According to this theory, a 
contract by its very nature is fair.13 A more acceptable approach, howev-
er, would look at the fairness of the terms before, during, and after the 
conclusion of the agreement, as well as the bargaining powers of the par-
ties involved. Supporters of the latter view even suggest that contract law 
is basically a part of tort law because an agreement to injurious terms 
should not exonerate the party who causes the injury.14 
In an excellent piece published in the Harvard Civil Rights–Civil 
Liberties Law Review, Professor Romero himself advocates for an analo-
gy between state tort law and immigration law. He notes that “immigra-
tion theorists can learn from states that have abandoned the traditional 
premises liability classifications in favor of a unitary ‘reasonable person’ 
tort law standard. This abandonment reflects the belief that the traditional 
premises liability classifications dehumanize the injured party.”15 
                                                 
 10. See generally VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2005). 
 11. For a catalog of Professor Romero’s works, see Victor Romero’s Publications, PENN. ST. 
DICKINSON SCH. OF L., http://law.psu.edu/_file/romero.pdf (last modified Apr. 30, 2009). 
 12. See, e.g., J.R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 208 (1980) (cited in Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and 
Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. 
REV. 769, 771 (1985)). 
 13. Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 773. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: 
On Guitterez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 60 
(2000). 
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Professor Romero suggests that the fairness of terms must be meas-
ured with objective and independent criteria regardless of the status of 
the individual.16 Although it is perhaps difficult to perceive his fairness 
point of view in the book under review, readers of this book should note 
that Professor Romero is highly sensitive to the issue of fairness of con-
tracts, and omission of its discussion is obviously due to the need for 
brevity and simplicity in creating a work that is accessible for the aver-
age reader. Fortunately, the last chapter of the book itself provides a list 
of excellent resources for further reference. 
III. THE CONTRACTS PARADIGM AND SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS 
Consider next the substantive and procedural due process aspects of 
Professor Romero’s contracts analogy. 
A. Substantive Due Process 
Professor Romero indicates that Congress, as the representative of 
the American people, writes the terms of the immigration contract. He 
cites numerous examples to substantiate his contract theory. Two exam-
ples are worth evaluating. First, he notes that in the immigration setting, 
the courts have given Congress unreviewable discretion—under the 
“plenary power” doctrine—beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Case 
in 1889.17 The plenary power doctrine, according to Professor Romero, is 
additional evidence of immigration law as contract.18 He suggests that 
                                                 
 16. Professor Romero states: 
Just as immigration law and immigrants’ rights law classify non-citizens in order to de-
termine what rights the U.S. government owes them, traditional tort law assigns rights to 
land entrants against landowners based on an entrant’s status. In tort law, there are three 
general approaches to the question of landowner liability for harms suffered by persons 
entering the owner’s property. Most states follow the common law tradition of examining 
the status of an entrant to determine landowner liability (“Model 1”). In this model, a 
landowner would owe a duty of reasonable care towards an invitee (someone permissibly 
on the property for the landowner’s benefit), but would generally owe a lesser duty, such 
as the duty not to act willfully or wantonly, to a licensee (someone permissibly on the 
property for his or her own benefit) or a trespasser (someone on the property without 
permission). Some states, notably California and New York, have abolished this tradi-
tional scheme of entrant classification in favor of a reasonable person standard. This 
standard assumes that all entrants have equal status as persons, and that the foreseeability 
of harm to the entrant, rather than the entrant’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser, 
should determine the landowner’s liability. 
Id. at 79–80. 
 17. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 18. ROMERO, supra note 8, at 7. Professor Romero also notes Professor Hiroshi Motomura’s 
support for the notion that immigration law is functionally like contracts law based on the Chinese 
Exclusion Case. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2005). 
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because Congress has unreviewable discretion, thus distinguishing im-
migration law from human rights law, migrants should not be disap-
pointed with unfair terms. It might be noted, however, that this pheno-
menon may actually distinguish immigration law from contract law be-
cause in contract law, courts often provide a remedy for grossly unfair 
terms predicated on principles of law and equity, including reasonable 
expectations, undue influence, unconscionability, mistake, and impossi-
bility. None of these principles of law or equity apply in immigration law 
under the plenary power doctrine. 
That said, the contract analogy would make perfect sense under the 
notion of contracts that existed at about the same time as the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, which could rightly be classified as the “Lochner era.”19 
Several Supreme Court decisions in that era, including United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co (1895),20 Smyth v. Ames (1898),21 and Lochner v. New 
York (1905),22 support this proposition.23 These decisions firmly estab-
lished the laissez-faire notion of contracts, i.e., if a contract is entered 
into “freely,” the Constitution imposes no restrictions on its fairness. As 
the Court paid more attention to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the decades following these decisions, this under-
standing of contract law became irreversibly eroded.24 Unfortunately, the 
same did not happen in the area of immigration law. The Lochner era 
immigration decisions—including the Chinese Exclusion Case, which 
held that Congress has unreviewable discretion even when the exclusion 
is based on race—remained substantially unaffected. For these reasons, 
perhaps, Professor Romero’s contract notion must be understood in the 
sense of the Lochner era’s laissez-faire notion of contracts. 
Second, Professor Romero also relies on a 2006 Supreme Court 
case, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,25 to show the continuity of the ple-
nary power doctrine and, thus, the contracts analogy. It certainly does 
                                                 
 19. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law prohibiting 
bakery work for more than sixty hours per week on grounds that it violates the rights of the contract-
ing parties to freely enter into any type of contract regardless of the possible harm to the workers). 
 20. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that a manufacturing monopoly of 98% of the country’s sugar 
refining many not be prohibited). 
 21. 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (striking down a Nebraska law relating to a minimum railway fare). 
 22. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 23. Although the Lochner era cases did the exact opposite of the Chinese Exclusion Case’s 
plenary power doctrine by striking down any limitation Congress made on freedom of contract, if we 
view immigration law as contract, the end result of the two sets of decisions is the same in an almost 
perverse way. 
 24. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (assigning expanded meaning to inter-
state commerce during the New Deal and beginning the erosion of the Lochner era freedom of con-
tract notion). 
 25. 548 U.S. 30 (2006). 
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support the analogy, but again, the contract must be understood in the 
Lochner sense. Fernandez-Vargas is a case of a Mexican national who 
lived in the United States for twenty years and prospered while having a 
deportation order against him.26 He married a U.S. citizen who petitioned 
for him to get permanent residence. But the authorities reinstated the 
twenty-year-old deportation order and proceeded to remove him.27 He 
challenged the order all the way to the Supreme Court, which failed to 
agree with him and approved the removal order.28 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress can change 
the law and make the respondent subject to new terms without his con-
sent.29 Had Congress not changed the law since he was ordered deported 
twenty years earlier, he would have been eligible for the kind of relief he 
was denied. Perhaps this unilateral changing of terms, particularly when 
the new terms are unfavorable to the weaker party, makes immigration 
law look more like a credit card contract than a typical bargained-for 
agreement.30 
B. Procedures and Evidence 
In terms of procedures and evidence relating to enforcement, the 
parallel between immigration law and contracts is limited to two aspects: 
(1) both are civil proceedings,31 and as such, (2) there is no right to ap-
pointed counsel.32 Professor Romero rightfully points to these. The simi-
larities, however, end there, and the dissimilarities are many. At the most 
basic level, contract disputes often entail property interests, but removal 
proceedings invariably raise liberty interests. As such, the ordinary per-
son would reasonably expect better procedural guarantees to exist for 
removal proceedings. Unfortunately, that ordinary person will be serious-
ly disappointed when he learns two things: (1) removal proceedings often 
                                                 
 26. Id. at 35–36. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 46–47. 
 29. See id. at 37–42. 
 30. For a good description of the nature and problems of credit card contracts, see generally 
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004), which also proposes regulatory 
intervention to ensure fairness because of the obvious lack of parity in bargaining power. 
 31. Despite the striking similarity between deportation proceedings and criminal proceedings, 
courts have consistently held that deportation proceedings are civil proceedings. See, e.g., INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 
(1893). 
 32. See INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigra-
tion judge and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal pro-
ceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the 
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”). 
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result in detention, just like criminal proceedings,33 and (2) the rules of 
procedure and evidence in removal proceedings are almost arbitrary, un-
like in contracts cases, which are often governed by systematic rules of 
procedure and evidence.34 
The average migrant with some familiarity with adversarial judicial 
proceedings having to do with contracts might be surprised to learn that 
immigration hearings can be quite different. For instance, the rules allow 
the immigrant to be cross-examined not only by the prosecutor, a U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorney, but also by the immi-
gration judge, who is supposed to be a neutral adjudicator.35 Another im-
portant distinction is that, unlike in regular contract adjudications, the 
evidentiary rules in removal proceedings allow the admissibility of hear-
say.36 That, of course, may include airport interviews, police notes, let-
ters from home government agencies or even persecutors, etc.37 Moreo-
ver, statistically, outcomes of removal proceedings are utterly unpredict-
able. Perhaps the single most important variable is the judge, but judges’ 
approval rates may vary from three percent to over seventy-five per-
cent.38 And the governing statutes make no provisions for meaningful 
administrative39 or judicial review.40 Finally, for those who are detained 
                                                 
 33. See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in Adversari-
al Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules of Evi-
dence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 114–15 (2007) (“The similarities between immigration deportation 
proceedings and criminal proceedings are not limited to the involvement of liberty interests and the 
physical restraint and removal of the individual. The actual proceedings are also quite similar. The 
government is represented by an attorney and the proceedings are quite adversarial. The respondent, 
just like a criminal defendant, is often detained and appears in a courtroom with a prison uniform 
guarded by a police officer at all times. The respondent answers charges filed against him by attor-
neys representing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). If the respondent is unsuccessful in 
defending against the charges, he is sent back to wherever it is believed that he came from. The 
actual deportation involves the physical custody of the deportee before deportation and the forced 
physical removal of the individual, often in handcuffs or other forms of body chains. For anyone 
observing these proceedings and following the consequences thereof, there is nothing civil about 
them. For all intents and purposes, they are the functional equivalent of criminal proceedings without 
the constitutional guarantees applicable in criminal proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 34. See id. at 115. 
 35. See INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (“The immigration judge shall administer 
oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 36. See Kidane, supra note 33, at 115–19, 142–50. See also generally INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a (2006). 
 37. Courts sometimes check the fundamental fairness of the admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401–03 (1971); see also Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 
F.3d 395, 404–07 (6th Cir. 2006); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405–08 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 38. See Asylum Disparities Persist, Regardless of Court Location and Nationality, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION (April 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/183/. 
 39. See Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rules relating to Affirmance Without Opinion 
(AWO), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2002). 
 40. See INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2006). 
896 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:889 
during the proceedings, the conditions of detention are probably much 
worse than what any migrant would expect to see in America.41 Although 
Professor Romero’s procedural discussions in Part III of the book are 
excellent, and his prior works address some of these deficiencies in de-
tail, his contracts theory could do more to sufficiently warn the unwary 
migrant about the extent of the arbitrariness in adjudication and the se-
verity of the conditions associated with removal proceedings. 
IV. THE BASICS 
Professor Romero divides the body of law applying to noncitizens 
into immigration law and alienage law,42 each of which he discusses in 
turn. 
For Professor Romero, immigration law is all about who may come 
in and who must leave.43 He describes the conditions of entry or admis-
sion and the conditions of exclusion or deportation/removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). With respect to the admission 
requirements, he begins by refuting a commonly held belief that there are 
many ways of immigrating to America. In actuality, according to Profes-
sor Romero, there are only four ways of immigrating to the United States 
for permanent residence: family relationships, employment, refu-
gee/asylum, and diversity visas.44 Perhaps the only other category that 
could be added to this list would be the possibility of immigrating per-
manently based on some specific visa, such as “U” visas for victims of 
specific crimes,45 “T” visas for victims of severe forms of trafficking,46 
and “S” visas for those who provide essential information for law en-
forcement purposes.47 Professor Romero discusses these visas under the 
nonimmigrant category and points out that holders of these visas could 
change their status to immigrant (i.e., lawful permanent resident); he 
does not include these visas in the main categories. The addition of these 
                                                 
 41. See Jailed Without Justice: Immigration Detention in the USA, AMNESTY INT’L (March 
2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGUSA20090325002&lang=e. 
 42. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 25. 
 43. See id. Although this is accurate and perhaps the best way of explaining it to the ordinary 
person, it carries the risk of understating laws and regulations pertaining to the conditions of stay 
that cannot be classified as alienage law. These conditions include whether one can work at all and, 
if so, where and for how many hours, as in holders and spouses of “F-1” visas, see INA 
§ 101(a)(15(F)(i) & (ii), and “J-1” visas, see INA § 101(a)(15(J)(i) & (ii), which he discusses under 
the nonimmigrant category. Other examples of immigration law regulating conditions of residence 
might include the “H” visa categories and regulations relating to whom visa holders may work for 
and for how long. 
 44. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 26–36. 
 45. See INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (West 2010). 
 46. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (West 2010). 
 47. See INA § 101(a)(15)(S), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (West 2010). 
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smaller and discrete categories would help exhaust almost all avenues of 
permanently immigrating to America. He goes through some of the non-
immigrant categories, but not in the same depth as the immigrant catego-
ries, perhaps because his targeted audience is primarily prospective im-
migrants.48 
Following his brief discussion of the various categories under 
which noncitizens may gain admission to the United States, Professor 
Romero notes that qualifying under any one of the several immigrant and 
nonimmigrant categories does not ensure admission, and he outlines 
grounds of inadmissibility. He correctly indicates that these grounds in-
clude health, poverty, crimes, national security, and prior immigration 
violations.49 He makes several interesting points under these headings. 
First, he recognizes that it is almost impossible to adequately de-
scribe the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability in a short survey 
book such as his. As such, the discussion obviously understates the com-
plexity. Second, Professor Romero points to the most frequent grounds 
of inadmissibility: criminal history and immigration violations. The laws 
relating to these two grounds are unreasonable and defy common sense. 
A migrant from any culture is likely to be surprised when he is told that 
he will be deported for shoplifting that he committed fourteen years ear-
lier when he was eighteen, or for possession of marijuana for personal 
use.50 A few examples of this sort would have provided a more sufficient 
warning to the unaware migrant. 
Professor Romero also discusses the category of offenses called 
“aggravated felonies” and notes that these are particularly serious crimes 
that typically include drug or violent offenses.51 He explains that “[s]ince 
the term [was] introduced in 1988, the definition of aggravated felony 
has grown tremendously to now include such crimes as the sexual abuse 
of a minor, child pornography, forgery, obstruction of justice, racketeer-
ing offenses, and crimes of violence.”52 But ordinary readers need to rec-
ognize that aggravated felonies include crimes that are neither felonies 
nor aggravated. A good example would be shoplifting. If a person shop-
lifts and gets a suspended sentence of one year, that crime is considered 
an aggravated felony,53 which means that he or she is not only deportable 
                                                 
 48. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 36–42. 
 49. See id. at 43–49. 
 50. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West 2010) (noting that 
there is no exception for drug-related offenses). 
 51. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 45. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.A § 1101(a)(43)(G) (West 2010) (defining aggravated 
felony as “a crime of theft (including receipt of stolen property) for which the term of imprisonment 
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but also lacks any form of remedy or relief, including cancellation of re-
moval54 and even asylum from persecution.55 
Professor Romero raises the terrorism grounds of exclusion as well 
but does not go into detail. It is, however, important to note the needless 
and unreasonable breadth of the definition of terrorism.56 In fact, this has 
increasingly become a trap for asylum seekers. All prospective immi-
grants need to be warned about this time and again. If you contribute 
money to a humanitarian organization and the humanitarian organization 
contributes money to a group of two or more people who cause injury to 
persons or damage to property by throwing stones in any corner of the 
world, you may be excluded for providing material support to terrorists.57 
Following his discussion of the various grounds of inadmissibility 
and deportability, Professor Romero provides an excellent summary of 
the various forms of relief. One form in particular begs some comments: 
citizenship as relief from deportation.58 Viewing citizenship as a form of 
defense from removal, although not uncommon, is interesting because 
citizens are not subject to immigration law. As Professor Romero ac-
knowledges, before a person may be deported, the government bears the 
burden of proving that the person is not a U.S. citizen. If a U.S. citizen is 
subject to removal proceedings, it is almost always because of an error of 
fact, and sometimes of law. Immigration officials do not have the author-
ity to grant citizenship as a form of relief from removal. Although it is 
difficult to view citizenship as a form of relief from removal, Professor 
Romero’s inclusion of citizenship in his relief section is quite unders-
tandable because of the need for simplification. 
Other leading scholars view citizenship as either the beginning or 
the end of the inquiry on immigration. For example, the authors of the 
two leading law-school textbooks on immigration take these opposite 
approaches. Aleinikoff et al. begin their book with a discussion of citi-
zenship.59 They define membership in a community and establish the 
right of a nation to define its polity and exclude others. In that sense, citi-
                                                                                                             
is at least one year.”). The fact that the sentence is suspended does not make a difference. See INA 
§ 101(a)(48)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (West 2010). 
 54. See, e.g., INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(a)(3) (West 2010) (excluding a person who has 
committed an aggravated felony from getting cancellation of removal). 
 55. See INA § 208(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (West 2010) (excluding a person who 
has committed an aggravated felony from receiving asylum). 
 56. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 46. 
 57. For a discussion of this possibility, see Won Kidane, The Terrorism Exception to Asylum: 
Managing the Uncertainty in Status Determination, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 689–709 (2008). 
 58. See ROMERO, supra note 8, at 49–50. 
 59. See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1. 
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zenship would be at the beginning of the spectrum as the authors ap-
proach the whole issue from the perspective of the nation.60 
The author of the other leading textbook, Professor Legomsky, ap-
proaches immigration from the perspective of the immigrant. For him, 
citizenship is at the end of the spectrum,61 not the beginning.62 Professor 
Romero’s view of citizenship as a defense from removal resembles Pro-
fessor Legomsky’s in some respects; however, because of the potential 
for misunderstanding and confusion with other forms of relief under im-
migration law, a brief and separate discussion of the rules of acquisition 
and loss of citizenship would have been helpful to the ordinary reader. 
Professor Romero does exactly that for the procedures—he has a sepa-
rate discussion of the procedures of naturalization and an excellent dis-
cussion of the special circumstances where children can acquire citizen-
ship by operation of law.63 Similar treatment regarding the rules of ac-
quisition and loss of citizenship would have added to the book’s 
achievements. 
V. ALIENAGE LAWS 
Having laid out the contours of immigration law, Professor Romero 
ends his book by venturing into the treacherous territory of alienage law. 
By doing so, he comes full circle because, as indicated above, he begins 
his discussion with the constitutional and theoretical underpinnings of 
immigration law. The same principles, in particular the plenary power 
doctrine, substantially inform alienage laws. But as the plenary power 
doctrine applies only to Congress, alienage-based classifications by 
states add an additional layer of complexity. While Professor Romero 
does not discuss the constitutional standards of review that apply to state 
laws as opposed to federal law for obvious reasons, he uses Plyler v. 
Doe64 to inform readers that states cannot constitutionally deny children 
of undocumented migrants access to their public schools. 
This is a simple and straightforward message: more rules are tole-
rated when they are made by Congress than by the several states—as in 
Texas’s denial of access to children of undocumented migrants in Plyler. 
He omits complexities from this section, but for those who are interested 
in the reasons for this disparate treatment, Professor Romero provides the 
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answer in his first chapter. There, Professor Romero properly explains 
the different standards of review that apply to federal and state laws justi-
fying different results for the exact same regulation. In particular, he uses 
Mathews v. Diaz,65 which upheld a federal law limiting the provision of 
Medicare assistance to immigrants who had not lived in the United States 
for more than five years,66 and Graham v. Richardson,67 which struck 
down a similar public aid policy because it was made by a state,68 to 
demonstrate the applicability of the rational relations test for review of 
federal alienage laws in line with plenary power decisions. Although the 
ordinary reader may have trouble connecting the dots, Professor Romero 
comes full circle when he discusses Plyler in the last chapter. The reader 
need only refer back to be reminded that the distinct treatment of state 
and federal laws is rooted in the courts’ view of the role of federal and 
state governments in the regulation of the admission and exclusion of 
migrants as well as the conditions of their sojourn.69 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Everyday Law for Immigrants, Professor Romero succeeds re-
markably in breaking down the complex rules governing admission, ex-
clusion, and conditions of residence of noncitizens. His attempt to ex-
plain the rules by injecting theoretical and constitutional inquiries has 
made the book more than a simple guide for newly arriving migrants. It 
has numerous characteristics that make it useful for various audiences. 
First, as indicated above, it is full of theoretical approaches, asser-
tions, opinions, and new ways of expression, which make it a very rich 
source for scholarly inquiry. As this Review suggests, some of these 
theorizations and assertions are highly provocative and are suitable for 
academic scrutiny. 
Second, it simplifies and expounds complex concepts and rules, 
which makes it an excellent resource not only for those who have their 
own immigration problems but also for those who are in the process of 
studying this area of the law, including law students and other would-be 
immigration practitioners. 
Third, it does not leave out the fundamental assumptions and un-
derpinnings of the law for the sake of simplicity, which makes it a valua-
ble guide for practitioners and nonprofit advocacy groups that provide 
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representation and, perhaps more importantly, those that conduct legal 
orientation programs for migrants. 
Fourth, it superbly demonstrates the law’s needless complexity and, 
as such, is a great resource for those who are engaged in drafting immi-
gration laws and regulations, as well as those who routinely write judicial 
and administrative opinions. 
Finally, it makes very suitable reading for anyone who wants to be 
better informed about the controversies surrounding the sensitive issue of 
immigration and the reality of the nation’s treatment of migrants. 
